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Summary findings
Economists and policymakers in the Soviet Union before  because they are both manifestations  of the samc
its dissolution  were concerned  about the growth of the  phenomenon.  In both cases, forced saving led to a
"ruble overhang."  The concern was that the rationing  of  reduction in purchasing power and downward  pressure
consumer goods evident in prior  years had led to an  on inflation.
excess of purchasing power  in households. Price  The difference was in the mechanism that induced
liberalization was expected to lead to a jump in  forced saving.
consumer prices as households tried to exercise their  For the ruble overhang,  the government maintained
purchasing power.  price rigidity; there was nonprice  rationing of output
But after the Soviet Union dissolved, a new concern  that was insufficient to satisfy demand at those rigid
emerged:  a ruble shortage.  Throughout  the ruble  prices.
currency area, govemments  and state enterprises could  For the ruble shortage,  the govcrnment  - through  the
not get enough  rubles to pay wages and pensions. As a  government-controlled  banking system - imposed the
result, households were unable to make the purchases  holding of bank deposits on households, through
they wanted to make.  Ruble shortages contributed  mandatory wage deposit programs and through  the de
greatly to the progressive deterioration  of the rublc area,  facto inconvertibility of deposits to currency.
from its beginning with fifteen members to its presenr  The result was the same: a rationed household  sector
membership  of two.  unable to trade  financial assets for commodities.
The names given to these two episodes - "ruble
overhang"  and  "ruble shortage"  - are misleading,
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Economists  and policr-makers  in the Soviet  Union  prior to its dissolution  were quite
concerned  with the growth of the 'ruble overhang.  The concern  was that  the rationing  of consumer
goods  that  had been evident  in prior years  had led to an excess  of purchasing  power with households.
Price liberalization  was expected  to lead to a massive  surge of consumer  prices as households
atempted  to use their purchasing  power.
After  the dissolution  of the Soviet  Union  a new concern  emerged:  the ruble shortage.
Throughout  the ruble currency  area, governments  and state enterprises  could  not obtain  sufficient
rubles  to pay wages  and pensions. Households  were as a consequence  unable  to make desired
purchases. These  shortages  were a major cause  of the progressive  disintegration  of the ruble area
from its beginning  widt 15 members  to its present  membership  of dtree.
The names  given to these  two episodes  are misleading,  fr  they are each a manifestation  of
the same  phenomenon.  In each case,  forced  saving  led to a reduction  of household  purchasing  power
and downward  pressure on inflation. The difference  occurred  in the mechanism  that induced  forced
saving. In the ruble overng  the goverment maintained  price rigidity;  there was thus non-price
rationing  of output insufficient  to satisfy  demand  at those  rigid prices.  In the ruble shortage,  the
government  through  the government-wontrolled  banking  system  imposed  forced  holdings  of bank
deposits  on households  through  mandatory  wage  deposit  programs  and a de factor inconvertibility  of
deposits  to currency.  The end result  is the same: a rationed  household  sector  unable to trade
financial  assets  for commodities.
In the next section  I provide  evidence  of the ruble-overhang  and  ruble-shortage  episodes. Iu
section  U  I present  a simple  model  of private  behavior  ttat illustrats the shared  forced-saving
phlenomenon.  Section  m summarizes  the argment and  suggests  extensions.L  Fron  Ruble Overhang to Ruble Shorage.
Ruble Overhang.
The Soviet  Union  of the late 1980s  was charactrized by fiscal  deficits,  price  controls  and an
allocation  of resources  disproportionately  to national  defense  and producer-good  output  As Nordbaus
(1990)  reports,  this led to shortages  of consumer  goods,  repressed  inflation  and an undesired  build-up
in household  holdings  of liquid  assets. McKinnon  (1991)  also notes  the positive  correlation  of the
liquid-sset buildup  with the Soviet  budget  deficit. His figures  are provided  in Table  1.  Prior to
1986  household  saving  deposits  rose at a roughly  one-for-one  rate with the  government  budget  deficit
- the Soviet  govremment  was mobilizing  private  saving  through  the financial  sector  to offset  the
budgetary  deficit  Subsequent  to that  time the budget  deficit totalled  much  more than  the increase  in
saving  deposits,  with the balance  being  made  up through  excess  growth  in both currency  and credit
stocks.
This excess  growth  did not lead to substantial  inflation  because  of the extensive  system  of
price controls. As Table  2 indicates,  despite  currency  emission  during  the 1987-1989  period  that
averaged  over 13  percent  growth  per amum, retai inflation  rates averaged  under  three  percent  per
azm.u'  Figure 1 illustrates  this build-up  in privatesector  holdings  of financial  assets. Holdings  of
both currency  and  household  deposits  rose as a share  of GNP over that  period,  representing  forced
saving  by households  since  goods  and services  were not avaflable  for purchase  The ratio of
household  liquid  assets  to household  income  rose  from about .60 in the 1970s  to about  .95 in I989.2
There was widespread  recognition  that this  forced  saving  had not removed  the inflationary
1 Dornbusch  (1992),  Table 1.
2  In economies  with greater  financial  development  the govement  will  finance  budget  deficits
through  issuing  bonds. In the Soviet  Union  the goverment used  the banking  system  as the
intermediary  to channel  resources  to the government,  and  household  deposits  in the commercia  banks
Cin  addition  to hoarding  of currency)  became  clais  on the government.Ovca&anglShoage-  4
pressure,  but simply  postponed  it until a later price  liberalization.  Remedies  suggested  for this
inflationary  pressure,  or 'rubIe overhang",  can be organized  into "supply-side'  and  demand-side'
policies. On the demand  side, McKinnon  (1991)  suggested  the raising  of interest  rates on deposits  to
convert  forced  saving into desired  saving  and  to encourage  the reduction  in currency  hoarding. On
the supply  side, proposals  induded the exchange  of government  assets  and  gold holdings  for the
excess  currency  and deposits. 1E  January  1991  the Soviet  govaement  undertook  a draconian  supply-
side policy  by declaring  large-denomination  bank  notes  to be no longer  legal  tender.  Holders  were
allowed  to exchange  them for smaller  bills  up to a maximum  governed  by a worker's monthly  salary
or a fixed  quantity,  whichever  was less. Household  saving  accounts  were frozen,  with individuals
allowed to withdraw only 500 rubles per monha3 The republics softened these regulations somewhat
in subsequent actions.
In 1991  the aggregate  fiscal  deficit  of the members  of the Soviet  Union  reached  26 percent  of
GDP.'  Price  controls  were relaxed  somewhat,  and inflation  reached  previously  unimagined  rates:
142  percent  on retail goods and  236 percent  on wholesale  products. This inflation  induced  the
govermment  to provide  transfers  to wage-earners,  pensioners  and savers  to index  partially  the value of
their incomes  and fiancial assets. However,  due to a lack  of goods  and services  the households
retained  the transfers  in forced  saving  of deposits  or currency  holding.  The real value of household
deposits  was reduced  somewhat  by the inflation,  while  the ratio of currecy in circulation  to GDP
remained  nearly  constant.
The former  republics  of the Soviet  Union  cooperated  nearly  unanimously  on the liberalization
of the majority  of wholesale  and retail  prices  on 2 January  1992. Those  not liberalized  were nearly
3  These  details are reported  in McKinnon  (1991,  p.  157).
4  The information  in these  two  paragraphs  is drawn  from World  Bank  (1992).ovcxag/onagc-  S
all raised  in price by between  300 and  500 percent. Given  the repressed  inflation  represented  by the
ruble overhang,  prices  jumped  rapidly  - in the first three  months  of 1992  retail  prices  rose by 600
percent  and  wholesale  prices by over 1000  percent. This rise in prices  greatly  reduced  the value  of
nominal  assets  like  savings  deposits  and currency: by the end of January  1992  the ratio of money
broadly  defined  to GDP had fallen  to less than  20 percent.
Ruble Shortage.
Currency  shortages  were reported  throughout  the ruble  currency  area shordy  after the
dissolution  of the Soviet  Union.  The features  were  strikingly  similar  across  countries: producers
and government  had too little  access  to currency  through  their financial  accounts,  and thus could  not
pay wages  and pensions  in currency. Wage-earners  and  pensioners  then  received  insufficient  currency
to make  necessary  purchases. The problem  was exacerbated  by the rapid rise in retail  prices
throughout  the currency  area. A premium  arose  in the financial  intermediaries,  with  ruble-
denominated  bank deposits  selling  at a discount  to currency  rubles.
Table  3 provides  a chronology  of currency  shortages  in seven  of the republics. As noted
there, the incidence  of currency  shortage  is associated  with  aa inability  of enterprises  to pay wages
and of the  governments  to pay pensions,  benefits  and  other transfers. There is as well  a secondary
effect in purchase of consumer goods, as consumers  request to purchase on account because of the
incidence  of wage  arrears.
These  countries  can be separated  into  two  groups. In the first, currency  shorages  were
endemic  tbroughout  1992  and 1993. The countries  in which  these sustained  shortages  have  been
observed  are Ukraine  and Georgia. In Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  Lithuania  and  Russia  the shortage  of
rubles became  acute  in April 1992  and continued  until he fall; there was a fiter  episode  of
currency  shomge in May/June  1993  for Belarus,  Kazakhstan  and Lithuania. Estonia  provides  a third
model. As Hansson  (1992)  notes,  ruble shortages  existed  there prior to the intrduction of a newOvcuthingShoazgo-  6
carrency  in June 1992;  since  that  time,  there have  been  no such  shortages.
Since  independence  there  have  been  substantial  premia  for currency  over account  credits. 5
Table  4 illustrates  this point  with premia  drawn  from the foreign-exchange  markets  in Belarus,
Georgia  and Kazakhstan:  these  are the prenia implied  by enterprise  transactions  to convert  both
currency  and credits  to foreign  exchange. Similar  premia  exist for the direct  conversion  of
accounting  credits  to currency.  In Belarus,  for example, NobnalichkaN  dealers  converted  bank
credits  to curenw for a 30 percent  fee.'  These  dealers  had established  personal  contacts  with the
management  and  staff of banks,  and exploited  those  contacts  to circumvent  the regulations  or to
'jump the queuen  among  those  legally  entitled  to the scarce  domestic  currency.
Ihe non-convertibility  of bank  credits  to currency  can take the form  of rationing  based  on
availability  of currency. Altenatively,  non-convertibility  may  be suted explicidy  in regulations. In
1992  in Georgia,  for example,  the ability  to convert  bank credits  (deposits)  to currency  was regulated
by the Nadonal  Bank  of Georgia. State  enterprises  faced minor  restrictions  in access  to currency
while households  were in most cs  denied  convertibility  of existing  deposits. Kazakhstan  introduced
similar  restrictions  on the availability  of currency  for deposits  in February  1992  and renewed  them in
June 1993. One  feature  of the former restrictions  was the automatic  deposit  of 30 percent  of private
wage earnings  in banking  system  deposits  - these  were then  not convertible  into currency  in most
cases. The innovation  of the latter  restrictions  was the declaration  that all shops  must introduce  cash
registers  for currency  trade, with  the evident  hope that  the machines  would  allow  a  more accurate
I  Indirect  evidence  of ruble shortages  predates  the dissolution  of the Soviet  Union. During  the
period of stable  prices (.e.., pre-1991)  there was nevertheless  an excess  demand  for currency  rubles
relative  tD  credit  or account  rubles. This pressure  came  in large part from the value  of currency
rubles in untaceable  or black  market  transactions,  and  led to a premium  estimated  to be roughly  10
percent
'  Minsk  Economic  News,  July 1993.OvcthaagShoosa.- 7
tracking  of cash flows. 7
XI. A Simple  Model of Ruble Overhang and Shortage.
Consider  an economy  with three  sectors. The public  sector includes  both govemment  and
state enterprises.  The banking  sector  includes  both the central  bank and the formal  commercial
banking  system. Ihe private  sector  combines  households  with private  enterprises. There  will be
economic  transactions  within  each  of these sectors,  but  those  transactions  are not of immediate
interest. I will focus  on the currency  and credit  flows  among  sectors.
Macroeconomic  balance  conditions  can be stated  in real terms as:
(1)  y4 = C + I  aggregate  demand
(2)  = y  exogenous  aggregate  supply
(3)  y = C + S  household  use of income
C represents  privat-sector consumption,  I government  investment  and S private-sector  saving.'
The increase  in the price index  is modelled  as a tatonnement  process in excess  demand.
(4)  Ap =  (y _  y)  inflation  generation
The private-sector  decision  can be thought  of in two  parts.  The first is the allocation  of
U  kJkase  of N. Nazarbayev,  13 February 1992;  Resolution  #483  of the Cabinet  of the Republic  of
Kazakhstan,  8 June 1993.
'  The totals  are defined  net of taxes and government  current  expenditure,  and I can  be thought  to
include  any  residual  from that netting-out  process.Ovcaumgt5hcwta- £
current  real income  to consumption  and saving. The second is the allocation  of saving  among  real
holdings  of bank  deposits  (AD)  and currency  (MH). The optimal  allocation  can be represented  in two
stages: the allocation  in the absence  of rationing  or rigidities,  and the allocation  once spillover  from
rationing  is considered.' QuadranL  1 in Figure  3 illustrates  the unconstrained  optimum  through
reference  to an inditference  curve  in (C,S)  space;  the method  of generation  of this unconstrained
optimum  is not crucial.'  Saving  is then  allocated  to real holdings  either  of deposits  or of currency.
(5)  S=AH  + AD
This is illustrated  in quadrant  2.
The payments  mechanism  for the private  sector in the Soviet  Union  and the independent
successor  states  has been (and continued  to be) idiosyncratic:  currency  is used for the great majority
of transactions.  This can be stated  as the following  modified  quantity  equation,  with  v as the velocity
of currency.
(6)  Hv = C
This relationship  is illustated in quadrant  4 of Figure 3.  This non-reliane on bank deposits  (e.g.,
9This  distinction  is standard  in the literature. See, for example,  Muelbasuer  and Portes (1978)
and more  recently  Lin (1993).
10  I also  specify  the equilibrium  with  positive  consumption  and saving,  but that is not crucial
either. The argumntaon  will be identical  for periods  of dissaving.Ovudiang/Shanugo-  9
checking  accounts)  for purchases  is quite important  to die results  on inflation  suppression  that
follow.' 1
The benchmark  equilibrium  is thus defined  by C,  S; H' and AD'. I assume  that  the
economy  begins  at this optimum  with HE  in circulation.
Ruble  overhang.
During  the period  of ruble  overhang,  the government's  excess  expenditure  and controls  over
price required  conmnodity  rationing. Consider  the comparative  static of an increase  in investment
from I to P for given  y.  From (4) and (1) for unchanged  price:
(7)  y-  =  c-  <  C
with C, the rationed  quantity  of consumption.  That rationed  quantity  causes  saving  in excess  of
desired  at quantity  So,  and  generates  larger real accumulation  of financial  assets  (AD +  AH).  The
excess accumulation  of currency  in that total can be derived  from quadrant  4 as the quantity  of
currency  H' in excess of the new, lower H.l2
This rationing  equilibrium  leads to the quantity  (S - S) of forced saving. Recurrence  of this
process in each  period  will cause  a build-up  of the real  stocks  of fiancial  assets and  an increase  in
purchasing  power  as in Figure 1. For given  y, each  subsequent  period will have larger C due  to
positive  propensity  to consume  from wealzh. There  will thus  be increased  rationing  in each  period.
"  As Conway  (1994c)  demonstrates,  this  preference  for cumrcy  in transactions  need  not be
assumed. It can be explained  in the  present market-oriented  economy  as an equilibrium  outcome  of
the illiquidity  of bank (including  demand)  deposits. I maintain  it as an assumption  here to clarify  the
main result  of the paper.
12  There is thus in this example  no desired  portfolio  holdings  of curency ex ante. In Conway
(1994c)  I examine  the more  general  case of both  tasaction  and speculative  demands  for curency in
Sie private sector  and arrive  at the same conclusion  of this simpler  example.OveduSushoagp-  10
The mubls  overhang  will end with  price liberalization.  When  price controls  are removed  the
tatonnement  process  in (4) will cause  an upward  surge  in price. This upward  surge depreciates  the
purchasing  power  of the saving  overhang. The surge in price may be sustained  tirough a number  of
periods  as consumers  anticipate  the inflationary  path  and allocate  wealth  drawdowns  across  periods  to
reflect  that  path:  Conway  (1994b)  derives  this property  in a dynamic  model  of private-sector  saving.
Ruble Shortage.
I begin  again from the benchmark  equilibrium  with the comparative-static  increase  in
investment  from I to I@.  Price controls  are no longer  in place, and (4) describes  the translation  of
excess  demand  into inflation. As inflation  occurs, other  things equal,  the real stock  of currency
balances  falls. When  the real  stock  of currency  falls  below  the quantity  necessary  for real
consumption  C- from (6), then a ruble  shortage  exists." Consumption  is reduced because  currency
is unavailable  for purchases. Real  saving  is increased  relative  to the benchmark  amount  and  there is
an increase  in holdings  of financial  assets. For positive  real saving  AD must  be positive  as AH is
negative  by assumption.  This increase  in forced  saving  reduces  inflationary  pressure. Final-good
prices will rise by less  than in the free-market  case  due to the rise in forced  saving.
Figure  3 can be used  to illustrate  the ruble  shortage  case  of P causing  a sufficient  rise in the
price index  to reduce  the real money  stock  to H.  The 'ruble shortage"  causes  a reduction  in
consumption  expenditures  below  desired  because  many  would-be  consumers  cannot  convert  their
wealth  into a medium  of exchange.
For the great majority  of the population,  deposits  were not convertible  into currency  during
the ruble-hortage episodes. The premia  observed  were  typically  in thin markets  - there were few
traders  winling  to surrender  currency  (or goods  or foreign  exchange)  for accounting  credits. Conway
D  Ihe reduced  real stock  of currency  may be due to a reduction  in the supply  of currency,  or to
a growth  rate of crrency emission  less  than the inflation  rate.OveduguSbnha-  11
(1994a) outlines the reasons for this unwillingness  to hold bank deposits: an artificially low nominal
interest rate implying very negative real interest rates, restrictions on withdrawals that severely
limited the liquidity of the deposit, and the use of these accounting  credits in the case of producers as
the basis for taxation of activities.  Traders responded to these incentives  with an unwillingness  to
accept claims on bank deposits as payments:  although  the governments  of these countries encouraged
the use of checks, they were widely accepted only at state-owned  shops.
Cain  the inflation rate in the consumer price index rise more rapidly than the growth rate in
the supply of currency.? This has been universally true in the former Soviet economies during their
period of participation in the ruble currency area.  The public sector was given purchasing power
through creation of accounting credits not offset by desired saving.  This was inflationary in that
public-sector demand was augmented, leaving fewer goods for private-sector  consumption. The
public sector was unable zo obtain sufficient flows of currency to make wage and pension payments
and often simply passed the accounting  credits on to the househo!ds  through direct deposit in saving
accounts.  The bankdng  system is then unwilling or unable to convert the deposits into currency. This
non-convertibility  brings about the premia on currency noted in the previous section.
m.  Condusions and  Extensions.
The illustrative example of this paper demonstrates that the ruble overhang and ruble shortage
observed at various times in the Soviet Union and its successor states had sprng  from the same roots
- a rationing equilibrium in commodity markets.  This is the accepted explanation for the ruble
overhang; in this paper I demonstrate that the phenomenon  of ruble shortage can be attributed to the
same equililrium.
The terminology of overhang and shortage is imprecise in describing these phenomena. The
"ruble overhang  was really a wealth overhang, with private purchasing  power augmented  over theOveahung/Shongo-  12
years  by forced  saving  until potential  demand  for goods  and services  greatly  exceeded  supply. The
"ruble  shortage"  was really a currency  shortage  coincident  with a wealth  overhang. In both cases  the
private  sector  had built up holdings  of financial  assets  in excess of the stock  it wished  to hold; its
inability  to liquidate  these holdings  for conmmodities  is at the heart of the two  crises.
The record  on inflation  :oincident  with  the two crises is quite  different. The phenomenon
modeled  predicts  suppressed  inflation  through  forced  saving. This certainly  characterized  the  ruble
overhang"  period,  but seems  inconsistent  with  the high inflation  of the "ruble  shortage"  period. That
high inflation,  however,  was due to increases  in public-sector  borrowing  requirements  well in excess
of the forced  saving  achieved. An indicator  of dte effectiveness  of this rationing  mechanism  in
holding  down  price increases  can perhaps  be found  in the sustained  divergence  of the consumer  and
producer  price indices  in these countries: producer-price  indices  dependent  upon  public-sector
demand  and  supply  have  been significantly  and  consistendy  above  the consumer  price indices  based
upon private-sectr demand.
The model  of this paper  has been  kept  skeletal,  and the analysis  diagrammatic,  to simplify  the
exposition.  In other papers I have  examined  dynamic  adjustument  and private-sector  portfolio  holdings
in more complex  economic  models  (Conway  (1994b,  1994c))  and have derived  oonDcusions  idendcal
in spirit to these. Inclusion  of intemational  trade or holdings  of foreign  exchange  do not c"ange  the
spirt of these results. Trade deficits  become  a non-inflationary  source  of commodities  in the short
nw, with  long-run  payment  implications;  foreign  exchange  provides  an alternative  medium  of
exchange. So long as deposit are not convertible  into foreign exchange  the argument  still holds-Ovhaig/Sbegog-  13
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Table 1
Financial Statistics for the Soviet Economy
Government  Budget  Household  Saving
Deficit  Goverment Debt  Deposits
bilions of  percent of  billions of  pacent  of  billions  of  percent of
rubles  GNP  rubles  GNP  rubles  retail sales
1979  n.a.  n.a.  64  A.  146.2  57.6
1980  12  1.9  76  12.2  156.5  57.9
1981  9  1.4  85  13.1  165.7  57.9
1982  1S  2.2  OD  14.4  174.3  58.9
1983  10  1.4  110  15.1  186.9  61.1
1984  9  1-2  119  15.7  202.1  63.9
1985  14  1.8  133  17.1  220.8  68.0
1986  46  5.8  179  22.4  242.8  73.1
1987  52  6.3  231  28.0  266.9  78.2
1988  81  9.3  312  35.7  296.7  81.0
1989  92  6.9  404  43.4  337.7  83.7
Source  McKinnon (1991. Table 11.1)Ovahauge.SoUa-  15
Table 2
Growth of Currency in Circulation,  1987-1990
1987  1988  1989  1990
Growth of currency in circulation  7.7  13.6  19.5  24.3
Real growth in Net Material Product  0.7  4.6  1.9  -3.6
Retail price inflation  2.0  0.0  6.0  5.6
Sources:  World Bank (1992, p. 8), Goskomstat  USSR (1991, p.  28).Ovlrhang/Shorta  - 16
Table 3
Chronology  of Currency  Shortages:  Selected  Republics
Country  Period  Source  and magnitude  of shortage
Belars  May 1992  4 billion  rubles;  wage  arrears.
March 1993  ruble  shortage;  currency  flight
May/July 1993  reported  wage  arrears
Estonia  March 1992  ruble  shortage  requires  sale of hard currency  reserves.
Georgia  MayADecember  1992  severe  arrears  on wage and  pension  payments.
January/April  1993  4 mwnths  of wage  and pension  arrears,  and
widespread  eflbrts of consumers  to purchase  on
account  for lack of rubles. (60-80  percent  of potential
purchasers)
Kazakhstan  February/March  1992  Ruble  shortages  lead to Cabinet  of Ministers  edits 148
and 300, limiting  withdrawals  of currency  from bank
accounts.
May/August  1992  wage  and  benefit  arrears building  from 6 billion  to
15.4  billion  rubles.
May/September  1993  Ruble  shortfall;  many  firms  in July  were in 'pre
strike"  situation  due to wage  arrears. "NBw"  Russian
rubles  not yet accepted  as legal  tender,  despite  entry
l______  ____________  into circlation through  trade with  Russia.
Lithuania  February 1992  monthly  salaries  not paid  to government  officials
l  0xn~~~~~~~Ccluding  Prime  MsXniLte)
May 1992  3 billion  rubles  in wage and  pension  arres.
May/June  1993  talonas  shortfall;  in part due to the withdrawal  of
l_________  __________________  counterfeitable  banknotes  from  circulation.
Russia  December  1991  CBR  short 12 billion  rubles. Russian  Supreme  Soviet
/lJanuary 1991  places  restrictions  on curreny use and withdrawals.
May 1992  2 trillion  rubles  in wage  and benefits  arrears
June 1992  Kuzbass  workers  and trade  unon FNPR  threaten
strike  over non-payment  of wages.
Ukraine  January 1992  Ruble  shortage  equal to 25 percent  of wage  payments
l________________  leads  to introduction  of coupon.
June/August  1993  Wide-spread  currency  shortages  lead  to restrictions  on
curreacy  withdrawal  and use.
ources: data cobllection  network  and nes  a;ccounts.  Jndividual  monts indicate  a news account,
while  ranges  indicate  a series of accounts  or reports  from  data collectors  begun  in 1993.OvedragShoa-  17
Table 4
Premium of Currency over Accounting  Credits in Foreign-Exchange  Markets
Foreign Exchange Price Ratio:
Country  Period  Curency/Accounting Credit
Belarus  12 June 1993  1.80
15 August 1993  2.52
3 November 1993  6.10
Georgia  1 April 1993  7.69
18 June 1993  2.21
4 October 1993  2.54
Kazakhstan  16 June 1992  1.35
15 December 1992  1.15
20 May 1993  1.34
24 August 1993  1.37
Source:  data collection network.Ovethang/Shortg.-  18
Figure  1
Ruble  Overhang  In the Soviet  Union
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Ii  gure 2
Stylized Flow of Funds between Public, Banking and Private Sectors
Goods  purcbases  and  taxes Public Sector  Account  credits
Government/
State  Enterprises
Banking  Sector  Cash  deposits
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